Insurance Coverage for Damages for Emotional Distress in Montana by Munro, Greg
The University of Montana School of Law
The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings Faculty Publications
1-1-2004
Insurance Coverage for Damages for Emotional
Distress in Montana
Greg Munro
University of Montana School of Law, greg.munro@umontana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Greg Munro, Insurance Coverage for Damages for Emotional Distress in Montana Tr. Trends 26 (2004),
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/58
' INSURANCB CoNsuMER CouNsnt's ColuMN
INSun¡Ncn CoveRAcn FOn D¡l,r¡CBs Fon EuorroN¡r Drsrnnss IN MONr¡se
nv PxopnssoR Gn-ec Murvno
Inttoduction
Society has become more aware
of the mind-body connection. \ù7e
have long recognized that severe
injury to a person's body may cause
measurable limits on strength, endur-
ance, and tange of motion and Pro-
duce pain. Tort law has taken
cogrizance of these physical manifes-
tations of injuries to the person be-
cause they are consideted observable,
verifìable, and therefore, teal. At the
least, the civil justice system has rec-
ognized that such physical manifesta-
tions cost money to remedY and
cause a person to lose work so theY
constitute measurable damages of
pecuniary import appropriate for jury
consideration.
The same system has been much
slower in recognizing damages to the
mind suffeted by victims of torts,
especially injury to the mind caused
by watching loved ones get maimed
or killed. Today, we know that not
only does severe injury to the body
cause injury to the mind, but that
witnessing catastrophic injury to a
loved one or the physical effects of
such injury to a loved one likely
causes the same mental damage.
Therapists who treat patients now
recognize the unique debilitating
effects of such resulting maladies as
post-traumatic Sttess disorder and
emotional distress. They understand
the import of symptoms such as
memory loss, anxiety, depression,
mental preoccupation, tearfulness,
personality change, and compulsivity,
and appreciate theit signifìcance in
diagnosing emotional distress and
other trauma-related disorders of the
mind. Modern medicine recognizes
the intricate interrelationship between
the health of the body and that of
the mind.
Hence, the standard of cate for
plaintiffs' counsel is to identify emo-
tional distress not only in the physi-
cally injured plaintiff but in famllry
membets who may be suffering.
Family members must be carefully
assessed for psychological or emo-
tional injury to develop effective
proof of the injury as a recovetable
damage for putposes of negotiation
and trìal. F{owever, recovering dam-
ages for emotional distresò requires
that the law recognize as compens-
able the particulat form of emotional
distress suffered by the client. In
many cases, recovery also requires
that the insurance policy providing
coverage for the claim involving
emotional distress recognizes emo-
tional distress as a covered damage.
This article has the twin PurPoses
of exploring the citcumstances in
which Montana tort law recognizes
emotional distress as compensable
and examining the problem of secur-
ing insurance coverage of emotional
distress damages. Techniques for
,Emotional distress passes ander uarioas names such as mental sttfering,
mentøl angaish, neruutls shock, and includes ail highþ ønþleasant mental
reactions, such asfright, borror, gri$ shane, enþarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappoinìtrnent, and worry. Howeuer, it is onþ when ernotional
distress is extreme thatþossible liabiliry ari:es'"
Robetts w Saylot, (I(ansas 1981)1
investigation and proof of emotional
disttess damages must be left to other
sources. As in many other areas, the
law here is best undetstood by look-
ing at the relevant line of cases and
statutes in their historical context.
History of the develoPment of
ttemotional distresst' in Montana
In England, in 1808, Lord
Ellenborough held that, at common
law, there could be no recoverY fot
the wrongful death of a Person.2
Padiament eventually sought to ad-
dress the harshness of the rule by
enacting Lord Campbell's Act v¡hich
provided an zctton for wrongful
death.3 The act provided for iury
determination of damages as follows:
...[A]"d in every such action
the jury may give such dam-
ages as they may think ProPor-
tioned to the injuty resulting
from such death to the Patries
respectiveþ for whom and for
whose benefit such action shall
be brought.,.
However, Lord Campbell's Act
'was construed by the Queen's Bench
in 1852 to refuse recovery for mental
anguish in a wrongful death action.a
The court said that the purPose of
the Act v/as compensating families of
those killed and not "solacing their
wounded feelings." Hence, the
Queen's Bench found it eror for the
trial court to have instructed that the
jury, in addition to compensation for
loss of support, could comPensate a
widow for her emotional pain. The
court reasoned that a jury could not
find some pecuniary measure for the
damage so as to make it too difficult
to determine.
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The nrle that, in a wtongful
death action, one could not be com-
pensated for emotional pain became
known as the "English tule" and was
followed by most American iurisdic-
tions.s In Montana, the rule was rel-
egated to history by the SuPreme
Cout in 1983 in Dawson w llill &
IIì11 Truck Lines at the urging of
the late John Hoyt. Hoyt represented
a couple whose l7-year-old son was a
high school supersta{ slated to be
valedictorian of his class in May of
1982. He was killed when a ddver for
Hill & Hill Truck Lines attempted to
pass two cars during a snowstorm
near Belt, Montana. The truck col-
lided head-on with another oncoming
semi, and the careening trucks struck
the car in which Dawson's son rode,
killing him.
At that time, Montana permitted '
recovery for loss of society and com-
panionship but imposed apecutiary
loss rule allowing those losses only to
the extent that they had a pecuniary
value.6 The question Hoyt posed was:
"Ate damages for the sorrow, mental
distress or gdef of the parents of a
deceased minor recoverable in a
wrongful death action brought pursu-
ant to section2T-1-512, MCA,
1.979?" (À4ontana's wrongful death
statute.) The court, in holding that
"damages for the sorrow, mental
disüess or grief of the parents of a
deceased minor are recoverable,"
tetired the English de and overruled
"[a]ny previous Montana decisions, to
the extent they conflict with this
holding."
Emotional distress of the
'(bystandert'
The same day that Dawson u
Ilìllwas decided, the Montana coutt
followed the landmark Caltfornta
case of Dillon u Legg,7 in recogniz-
ing for the first time a cause of ac-
tion for negligent infliction of mental
and emotional distress. In Vercland
v Caton Ttanspott,s Bert Versland
was ddving ahay batler wagon on a
highway near Big Timber, Montana,
when a semi-ttuck dtiver neqligently
collided with Versland causing his
death. Versland's wife, Sharon, wit-
nessed part of the collision and then
saw her husband's body at the colli-
sion scene. She sought to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional
travma caused by witnessing the colli-
sion that caused her husband's death.
Eillon represented the latest
advance in recovery for bystanders.
Prior decisions had required first that
the bystander herself suffer some
physical impact, andlatei, that the
bystander atleast be in the 
"zone of
danger" before she could recover foÍ
emotional distress. The Montana
Supreme Court in Versland followed
Dillon in rejecting both limitations
and allowing recovery if it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that defendant's
conduct which causes injury or death
to a farrtsly member would cause
mental distress to another farnjly
member who witnessed the accident.
The court considered the Dillon
factors to determine whether emo-
tional distress would be considered
foreseeable so as to invoke a duty of
care to the bystander and ultimately
adopted its own three factors:
1) The shock must result
from adirect emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sen-
sory and contemporaneous
perception of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its
occufrence.
2) The plaintiff and victjm
must be closely related, as corl-
uasted with an absence of any
relationship or the presence of
only a distant relationship.
3) Eithet death or serious
physical injury to the victim
must have occutted as a result
of defendant's negligence.
Importantly, Vercland held that
physical manifestations of emotional
trauma would not be required to
support aþrimafacia case for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.
The problem with Vetsland
Unfortunately, the corollaty to
Vetslandwas that the family member
who was not present at the scene
could not recover. "Íhe 1992 case of
Maquirc u State of Montanae'iJus-
trated that category of cases in which
the Dillon/Vetsland tests would
deny recovery to one who clearþ
suffered emotional distress. Mrs.
Maguire had an autistic and severely
retarded daughter ryho could not
communicate. At age four, she placed
her in the Montana Development
Center, an institution run by the State
of Montana. \)Øhen the daughter was
an adult, her caregiver at the MDC
raped and impregnated her. The elder
Mts. Maguire had to deal with a num-
ber of difficult issues of the preg-
r7aîcy,including: 1) whether the baby
would suffer the same diseases as its
mother;2) whether to have the baby
aborted in spite of her Catholic reli-
gion; 3) whethet to raise the baby or
place it for adoption; and 4) whether
her daughter was safe. Undoubtedly,
Mrs. Maguire suffered greatly from
stress and depression and the result-
ing symptoms of which she com-
plained like trouble sleeping,
nightmares, contemplation of suicide,
and generally feeLing run down. She
required multiple visits to her doctor
and a psychologist.
The question facing the court in
Maguirc was whether Mts. Maguire
could maintasn an action in court for
her emotional disttess. Though she
manifested very substantial mental
and perhaps even physical injur¡ the
court found she could not meet
Vercland's "presence requirement"
that "the shock must result from a
direct emotional impact upon plain-
tiff from the sensory and contempo-
raneous perception of the accident as
contrasted with learning of the acci-
dent from others after its occur-
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rence." Not could she meet the pres-
ence tequirement of Restatement of
Torts $ 46 (2) which provides for
recovery for injury to a claimant for
extfeme and outrageous conduct
directed at a third person:
(2) Where such conduct is directed at
a third person, the actor is subject
to liability if he intentionally ot
recklessly causes severe emotional
distress:
(a) to a member of such petson's
immediate farnity who is present
at the time, whether or not such
distress results in bodily harm,
of
þ) to any other percon who is
þresent at the tine, if such distress
results in bodily hatm.
The court noted that it had al-
lowed recovery of emorional distress
damages without physical injury in
tohnson w Supersave and -IVrIes r¿
Big Sky Eyeweaqto but pointed out
that, in both cases, the victim was not
a third party. Either the conduct had
to be rìirected at Maguire or Maguire
had to be present regardless of the
causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and Mrs.
Maguire's resulting injury. Recovery
was denied.
Emotional disttess of the claim-
ant absent a showing of physical
or mental iniuty
lohnson w Supetsaverll was
decided shortly after Vercland and
represented another category of
emotional distress claims 
- 
those
involving no physical or mental in-
juty. Johnson was arrested and jailed
on a bad-check warrant alur-ough he
had made complete restitution on the
check six months before his arrest.
Supersave had failed to tell its collec-
tion agency, which filed the bad
check complaint with the county
attorney's office, that the check had
been made good.
The jury found Supersave negli-
gent and awarded $17,000 in dam-
ages for emotional distress. At trial,
Johnson proved no physical injury or
mental injury, so that the question
was "Whether emotional disüess
damages are proper in a negligence
action absent finding of injury." The
Johnson court noted that in Versland
they rejected any requirement that
some physical manifestation must be
present to support a "prinafaria case
for negligent infliction of emotional
distress." They further noted that
there is a diffetence between injury
and distress, confrming that whete
there is "either a psychic or physical
injury causally related to the incident
in question there is compensabiliry."
The court said, "Llere we hav€ no
testimony supporting injury. $7e must
decide whether to allow cornpensa-
tion for mental distress absent injury
and, if so, under what circum-
stances." The decision states:
This coutt adopts the species
of case approach which re-
quires a factual analysis of
each case to detetmine
whether the alleged "emo-
tional distress" merits com-
pensation. In determining
whether the distress is com-
pensable absent a showing of
physical or mental injuty, we
will look to whether tortious
conduct results in a sabstantial
invasion of a legaþ protected
interest and causes a signfrcant
impact upon the person of
plaintiff.
In Johnson, the court found
Jiberty to be the right substantially
invaded and held it proper for the
juty to award Johnson damages for
emotional distress.
tohnson was followed in 1989
by First Bank (N.A.)-Billings u
Clatk,12 abank bad faith case in
which the court held that the trial
coutt erred in instructing the jury
about damages for emotional distress
because the claimant failed to intro-
duce any evidence of damage from
the emotional distress. Quoting
tohnson, the court required "some
proof that plaintiff's tortious conduct
resulted in 'a substantial invasion of a
legally protected interest and . . .
fcaused] a significant impact on the
person."'
Of particular importance is the
factthatthe coutt found the neces-
sary legally protected interest to be
"the interest in freedom from emo-
äonal distress." However, the court
noted that "the cause of action arises
only if the invasion of this interest is
substantial and the impact sþifi-
cant," adopting comment þ) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 46
(1965) which is quoted in the opinion:
Emotional distress passes
under vafious flames such as
mental suffering, mental an-
guish, mental or nervous
shock, or the like. It includes
all highly unpleasant mental
teactions such as fright, hor-
ror, gitef, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, cha-
grin, disappointment, worry,
and nausea. It is only v¡here it
is extreme that the liabiJity
arises. Complete emotional
uanquility is seldom attain-
able in this wodd, and some
degree of transient and trivial
emotional distress is a part of
the pdce of living among
people. The law intervenes
only where the distress in-
flicted is so severe that no
reasonable person could be
expected to endure it. The
intensity and the duration of
the distress ate factors to be
considered in determining its
severity. . . The distress must
be reasonable and justifìed
under the citcumstances, and
there is no liability where the
plaintiff has suffered exagger-
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ated and unreasonable emo-
tional distress, unless it results
from a peculiar susceptibilty
to such disttess of which the
actor has knowledge . . . It is
for the court to determine
whether on the evidence se-
vere emotional distress can be
found; it is fot the jury to de-
tetmine whether, on the evi-
dence, it has in fact existed.
At trial, Clark alleged only that
he "felt bad, lost sleep, and became
withdrawn" as a result of the Bank's
conduct; The court said its adoption
of the Restatement comment was
'ionly a new interpretation of the
existing'significant impact' require-
ment" in refusing to remand for a
nev¡ trial on emotional distress.
Recognition of the tort of
emotional distress
In 1995, recognizing that the law
of emotional distress had become a
complex patchwork in which the
exceptions had eaten the rules, the
court set out to simplify the area by
recognizing the torts of negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Sacco w Iligh Countty
Independenf Press, Inc.13 When
Diane Poynter Sacco, a photographer
and teporter for the High Country
Independent Press at Beþade,
Montana, quit her employment, her
employer accused her of stealing
photographic negatives and proof
sheets and filed criminal charges
against her. When the criminal pro-
ceedings were ultimately dismissed,
Sacco brought a civil action against
the ptincipals of HCIP and the police
offìcer involved alleging malicious
prosecution, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negli.
gent infliction of emotional distress,
and civil rights violations. All five
counts were dismissed on motions
for summary judgment, resulting in
an appeal to thdMontana Supreme
Court. Hence, the court was pre-
sented with the issue of whether
Montana would recognize causes of
action for intentional and negligent
infLiction of emotional distress. Until
that time, emotional distress was
recognized primariþ as a " parasittc"
damage to a host cause of action, the
taditional rule having been that there
could be no recovery for the negli-
gent infliction of mental distress
alone,la
However, the court took the
occasion to recognize the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional
distress in Montana:
Therefore, we adopt the fol-
lowing standard for determin-
ing whether a plaintiff has
demonstrated a cause of ac-
tion for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress. A cause
of action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress will
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atise under circumstances
where serious of sevefe emo-
tional distress to the plaintiff
was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's
negligent act or omission.
The court emphasized tepeatedly
that the standard required 1) ptoving
that the emotional distress suffered
was severe or serious, and 2) that the
emotional distress was the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's negligent act or omission.
The court cited Restatement (Second)
of Tortsls for the role of judge and
jury in determining emotional distress:
It is for the court to detetmine
v¡hether on the evidence severe
[serious] emotional disttess can
be found; it is for the jury to
detetmine whethet, on the evi-
dence, it has in fact existed.
Again; the court defined "seri-
ous" of "sevefe" emotional distress
by quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts, $ 46, comment Q) at77-78
(quoted above).
The court then conceded on
review thatit had tacidy approved
intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a separate cause of action
in three casesl6 and therefore pro-
ceeded to state a new cause ofac-
tion for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In so doing, it
abandoned the former requitement
that the damage of emotional dis-
tress be appendant to "outrageous"
conduct.
. . . aî independent cause of
action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress will arise
under circumstances where
serious of sevefe emotional
distress to the plaintiff was the
reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant's in-
tenlional act or omission.
The court reiterated that dar¡,-
ages for emotional distress are
compeflsatory and not punitive but
concluded:
NØe concludethatan award of
punitive damages is the proper
method of addtessing the cul-
pability and intentional nature
of the defendant's conduct in
an intentional infliction of
emotional distress case.
In essence, the elements of the
two torts are the same, the only dif-
ference being in the culpability of
defendantb conduct which may result
in punitive damages being awarded
under MCA S 27 -1,-220 in addition to
the damage for emotional distress.
Sacco was intended to simplify and
modernize the rules with regard to
recovery of damages fot emotional
disüess. Hurdles such as the by-
stander requirements of Vetsland,
the "substantial invasion of a legalJy
protected intetest" of tohnson, and
the "outrageous" conduct requife-
ment of Maguite all were relegated
to the museum of past doctrines by
the court in Sacco.
Triggering the (rpet accident"
limits of insurance coverage with
emotional distress
Tacttcally, the effort to obtain an
adequate recovery for the injuted
party often involves an attempt to
recover an additional limit of insur-
ance essentially doubling the poten-
tial recovery of the clients in serious
cases. The only way to obtain the
"per accident" limit as opposed to
the "per person" limit of auto insut-
ance is to establish that another
person has suffered an injuty cogni-
zal:/reby the coutt as an independent
cause of action. Otherwise, a para-
sitic damage suffered by a family
membet and appendant to the claim
of the person who suffered bodily
injury will not trigger a separate limit
of insurance. For example,in Bain
u. GleasonrlT the court established
that a spouse's loss of consorlium
claim is indeed a distinct and inde-
pendent cause of action under tort
law However, the court held that the
spouse's consortium claim is detiva-
tive of the bodily injury claim of the
person suffering the direct physical
injury.
The standard ISO language of
ìnsurance poLicies tends to defìne
"Bodily lnjuty" as follows:
Tesffimony
all health-care disciplines.
Available to review and test¡fy
in medical negligence cases.
30 years, 6,000 cases
Member, American Gollege
of Legal Medicine
ey references statewide
rtilied experts in
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'ßodiþ Injary means bodily
injur¡ sickness, or disèase,
including death at any time
resulting therefrom, sustained
by a person."
The same forms define the in-
jured person's "damages" to include
the services of that pefson:
'Damagaswith respect to Cov-
erage A Þodily injuty Cover-
age] includes damages for care
and loss of services."
Therefore, the court in Bain
concluded that the spouse's consor-
tium claim is included within the
"each pefson" limitation on auto
insurance coverage and does not
tdgger the additional or "per acci-
dent" limit:
"!üe therefore interpret the
mandatory motor vehicle in-
sufance statutes now in effect
to mean that the cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium by
the deprived spouse and the
cause of action for bodily inju-
ries by the injured spouse are
subject together to the 'one
person limitation' found in
S 61-6-103, MCA, as referred
to in $ 61,-6-301, MCA."
We should note, however,th^t
whether consortium trþgers an addi-
tional limit depends on the insurer's
definition in the particular policy. For
example, the coutt in Bain noted that
an Allstate policy that defined bodily
injury as "bodily injury, sickness,
disease or death to a person, includ-
ing loss of seruices" resulted in trigger-
ing additional covetage. Under that
defirrition, the spouse suffedng loss
of consortium has suffered "bodily
injury" so as to trþger the "per acci-
dent" limit of coverage.
Emotional distress of a famtly
member of the physically injured
victim is so important because it
presents the potential for recovering
the additional limit of coverage. In
TteÌchel w State Fatm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co.r18 the Montana Supreme
Coutt held that negligent infliction of
emotional distress to a family mem-
ber riggers the second or "per acci-
dent" limit of insurance.
In'Íteichel, the petitioner,
Catoþ Treichel, had been riding
bicycles with her husband on Old
Montana Highway 200 near East
Missoula, Montana, v¡hen she wit-
nessed a car collide with her husband,
inflicting a grievous head injury and
causing his death. The paties agreed
that she met all necessary elements of
â cause of action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The court
refused State Farm's argument that
her claim should be treated the same
as Bain's claim for loss of consor-
tium and considered derivative. In-
stead, the court held that Caroþ
Treichel "w^s a second injured per-
son in the accident" so that the
"Each r{.ccident" limits in the policy
applied.
Kílling the risen specter of
bystander requirements
In Treichel, in the process of
distinguishing the emotional distress
claim in that case from the Bain loss
of consortium claim, the court stated:
Unlike Caroþ, the plaintiff in
Bainwas not at the scene:of
the accident and did not wit-
ness the injuries to his spouse.
*x*Caroþwasaseparate
person who received an inde-
pendent and direct injury at
the accident scene. Her serious
and sevete emotional distress
was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of Hintz's negli-
gence.
On reading this language, de-
fense counsel could not resist the
position that the court, in 'Íreichel,
had reintroduced the contemporane-
ous impact requitement from
Vetsland. Consequentl¡ the issue
was again injected in Wages w Fitst
National Ins., Co. of Amedca.le
There, a child, Skylar \Øages, was run
over by a truck whjle roller-blading in
front of his home. The father, Gerald
'Wages, 
was notified at work and went
to the hospital. Skylar's serious inju-
ries included pelvic fracture and com-
plete urethral disruption which
required four major invasive surger-
ies, physical therapy, and catheteitza-
tion performed by his father three or
four times each day. Ultimately,
Gerald suffered extensive work loss,
medical expense, and other ltnancial
obligations by reason of his care for
Skylar. He fìled his own claim for
Àegligent infliction of emotional
disüess ro which the defense took the
position that he could not sustain an
independent non-derivative claim for
negligent infliction of emotional
distress without having witnessed the
accident so as to suffer some contem-
poraneous impact. However, the
court reiected the position quoting
Treichelin holding:
"[]n clarifying the elements of
a clakn for negligent infliction
of emotional distress in
Sacco,we eliminated the other
various sorts of theories by
which independent torts of
negligent infliction of emo-
tional distess came into Mon-
tanalaw such as the Vetsland
bystander analysis."
The court said that its language
in Trcichelwas intended to support
the distinction between NEID claims
and loss of consortium claims. Nor
did the court accept the position that
one must be at the scene of the acci-
dent to be a foreseeable plaintiff
saying, "In Sacco we severed the
previously mandatory nexus between
witnessing the accident and foresee-
abiliry and established that a defen-
dant can owe a duty to a NIED
Tru¡r. TnpNos - Suivrrvren 2004 PecB 33
claimant even in circumstances where
the claimant was not at the scene of
the accident." The court then set out
guidelines for determining foresee-
ability in NEID cases:
For such a determination, the
court may consider such fac-
tors as the closeness of the
relationship between the plain-
tiff and victim, the age of the
victim, and the severity of the
injury of the victim, and any
other factors bearing on the
question. Moreovef, the court
may consider whether the
plaintiff was a bystander to
the accident. It may not, how-
ever, rely exclusively on the
fact that a plarnttff was flot a
bystander to conclude that
such a plaintiff is an unfore-
seeable plaintiff.
Vages appeared to establish that
the law of emotional distress is that
which is set out in Sacco, unencum-
bered by the theories and require-
merìts thathadvexed those repre-
senting injured persons during the
development of emotional distress
law.
,\gain, in llendcksen w State,2o
the court conlrmed that one is not
required to be a bystander to recover
damages for emotional distress suf-
fered as a result of serious injury to a
family membet. There, a mothet
watched asher 3-year-old slipped
through a stakway balustrade at the
Monrana State University library and
fell head first 20 feet to the concrete
floor belov¡. Immediately after the
accident, she leatned that another
child had fallen through the same
staitway weeks eadler. Her position
was that the knowledge of the eadier
fall was a factor in causing her emo-
tional distress þost-traumalic stress
syndrome). The State's position was
that she could not claim emotional
distress damages caused by the earlier
fall because there was no ditect emo-
tional impact upon the plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous
perception of the accident. Howevet,
the court cited Sacco and Vages for
the proposition that one need not be
a bystander to claim emotional dis-
uess damages. Being a bystander is a
factor to be considered, but is not, by
itself, determinative.
The court also found the trial
court erred in concluding that the
heightened standard of severe or
serious distress required by Sacco
only applied in cases where there is
no physical or mental injury. The
court clarified that emotional distress
must always be severe or serious
regardless of physical or mental
manifestation. The court cited Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, $ 46,
commerit k for the proposition that
" [n]ormally, severe emotional distress
is accompanied or followed by shock,
illness, or other bodily harm,which in
itself affords evidence that the distress
is genuine and severe." The court
said, "A jury instruction on emotional
distress should state that the sevete
and serious standard applies and that
this standard can be met by proof
that emotional distress resulted in
shock, illness, or other bodily haÍm."
Getting insurance to cover the tort
Exuberance over the develop-
ment and clarifrcald'on of emotional
distress law has been dampened
somewhat by the recent reminder
that, for plaintiffs, all is lost if insur-
ance will not cover the conduct of
the tortfeasor or the resulting dam-
age. The recent case of tacobsen u.
Fatmerc Union MutuaL Insutance
Companfl reflects that ugly fact of
ìife. Jacobsen was driving his vehicle
on the four-lane highway near
Vaughn, Montana, when he saw a
vehicle veer across the center median,
cross the highway, and crash in a
wheat field. Jacobsen found l(eyser in
the vehicle bleeding profusely from
the head. He tried to control the
bleeding until patamedics arrived and
temoved I(eyser from the vehicle. At
that point, Jacobsen sav/ a gun under-
neath the body. I(eyser died later
from what was determined to be
suicide by gunshot.
Jacobsen sought counseling for
emotional distress from the events
and ultimately made claim against his
own insurer, Farmers Union Mutual,
for benefìts under the uninsured and
medical pay coverages, (I(eyser was
uninsured.) The district court granted
the insurer summary judgment on the
twin grounds that 1) Jacobsen's emo-
tional injuries did not constitute
"bodily injury''within the meaning
of the UM statute S 33-23-201ot the
UM policy agreement, and2) the
emotional disttess did not arise from
use of an uninsuted motor vehicle
but from a handgun.
The UM basic insuring agree-
ment corìtained standard language:
l7e will pay a\1. sums the "in-
sured" is legally entitled to
fecovef as compensatory
damages from the owner or
driver of an 'Íuninsured motot
vehicle." The darnages must
result from "bodily injury"
sustained by the "insured"
caused by an "accident.2'The
owner's or dtiver's liabiJity for
these damages must result
from the ownership, mainte-
nânce or use of the "unin-
sured motot vehicle."
The policy's definition of "bodily
injaryi'which is consistent with the
statute's, was as follows:
"Bodily injury" means bodily
injury, sickness or disease sus-
tained by a person including
death resulting ftom any of
these.
Jacobsen atgued that the courtb
holding in Treìchel, that Caroþ
Treichel's emotional disttess zt watch-
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Farm was willing to cover
emotional injuries but only
up to the "one pefson"
limitation in the policy. The
Tteichel court had held
that State Farm was simply
estopped to deny covefage
and found that Caroþ
Treichel had suffered an
"independent and direct"
injury as was deemed com-
pensable in Sacco.
ing her husband get killed in a bike/
car collision was "bodily injury"
under the provisions of the State
Farm policy, apptied in his case.
However, the court pointed out that
State Farm's policy in Treicåel did
not defìne bodily injuty and that the
policy cleady covered such claims as
loss of consortium. Further, State
In this case, expert medical
testimony was inttodu-ced at
trial which described lGistin's
PTSD symptoms. The expert
stated this well-tecognized
mental injury has physical
components, including brain
chemistry and hotmone le-vel
alterations. PTSD symptoms
Sacco provides plaintiffs'counsel with a
simple and clear remedy for any person
who has foreseeably suffered severe or
ser¡ous emot¡onal distress at the hands of
one act¡n g negligently or intentionally.
are a response to an emotional
travma that leads to a physical
impact upon the brain.
Counsel needs to develop the
theory with experts that a manifest
mental injury is nothing but a reflec-
úon of physical impacts in brain
chemistry, hormone levels, and
other components of the body's
physiology.
Suffìce it to say that counsel
should always consider the potential
unintended (and undesirable) conse-
quences of pleading interutiorual inflic-
tion of emotional distress as an
intentional tort. ìØhile it presents the
defendant with a risk of punitive
damages, it may allow the tortfeasots'
liability insurers off the hook under
an intentional acts exclusion ot on
the ground that the basic cor.erage
agreement only covers "accidents." If
feasible and not in violation of Rule
1.1, counsel may be wise to accom-
pàny à count for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress with one
for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Then, under the "four cor-
ners" rule, the catrier will likely have
to defend and still cope with the
potential conflicts injected by the
intentional tort and its punitive dam-
age claim.
If the emotional distress arises
from an auto accident and the
tortfeasor is uninsured, one can still
allege intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and recover under
uninsured motorist coverage. The
Montana Supreme Court has held
that conduct can be inten-
tional so as to fall outside
the tortfeasor's liabiJity
coverage and stjll be l'acci-
dental" from' the victim's
perspective so as to fall
within the victim's UM
coverage,'2
Conclusion
The tort law of em<¡-
tional distress that devel-
In essence, what the court said in
tacobsen is that finding a person has
suffered an emotional "injury" for
purposes of tort law does not mean
the emotional injury is "bodily in-
jury" undet insurance contract law.
The court quoted with approval
Farmers Union's assertion that
"ft]here is no dispute that Montana
tort law allows for tecovery of purely
emotional damages. However, this
case involves the interpretation of
contract, and tort law is wholly irrel-
evant to that interpretation." The
court held that"the term 'bodily
injury,' as defined in Farmers Union
UM policy, is limited to physical
injury to a person caused l>y an acit-
dent and does not include emotional
and psychological injuries stemming
therefrom. Consequently, the coutt
declined to answer whethet l(eyser's
infliction of emotional distress on
Jacobsen atose from the use of the
auto as opposed to the handgun.
SØhere the applicable insutance
coverage is for "bodily injury,"
tacobsen makes it imperarive that
counsel approach development of the
claim the way Monte Beck apparently
did in .Flenricksen.In reviewing
Henticksen, the court noted:
oped in Montana came al>out as a
tortured system fot getting around
hatsh common law rules that disal-
lowed emotional distress recovery
entìrely. Sacco provides plaintiffs'
counsel with a simple and clear rem-
edy for any person who has
foreseeably suffered severe or serious
emotional distress at the hands of
one acting negligendy or intentionally.
Bystander's restrictions, requirements
for proof of invasion of substantial
personal interests, and other require-
ments of the pre-Sacco cases should
not hinder counsel anymore. How-
ever, if the emotional distress claim
cannot be supported by evidence that
it is severe or serious, it will lack
credibility and may not merit pros-
ecution,
,{.s with all claims, counsel plead-
ing and proving the emotional dis-
tress claim must keep one eye on
potential insutance coverage. Insur-
ance benefits depend on the language
of the insurance coverage, and ulti-
mately recovery may hinge entirely
on whether, under the facts of the
particular case and the language of
the applicable polic¡ the claimant's
emotional distress is a "bodily
injury."
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Facts About Lawsuits That Tort
"Reformers" lqnore
Business cases accountfor 47o/o
of all punitive damage awards.
ln contrast, only 4.40/o and 2o/o
of punitive damage awards are
due to product liability and
medical malpractice cases
respect¡vely.
(Rand lnstitute for Civil Justice,l ggóf
r.nrts Gnr RBer
A-n¡, Arupnrc¡,Ns SUB-Hnppy? You Bn Trrn Juocn.
Myth #1: 'Americans sue at the drop of ahat."
Fact: Very few injured Americans file lawsuits. Only ren percent of injured
Americans ever file a claim for compensation, including informal demands and
insurance claims, and only two percent file lawsuits. Cornþensation for Accidental
Injøriu in the United States,Rand Institute for CivilJustice (1991),
l,{ytr:L #2: "More and more tort cases are being filed each year."
Fact: Tort lawsuit filings have decreased nine percent stnce 1,992, according to
the country's most accurate and comprehensive overview of state court litigation
statistics. Exarniruing the ll/ork of State Courts, 2002, ajoint project of the Confer-
ence of State Court Administrators, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Na-
tional Center for State Courts' Court Staristics projects Q003).
Myth #3: 'Jury verd.icrs are exploding."
Fact: rA.ccording to data released April 1, 2004, medran jury awards in personal
injury cases 'lfell significant)y," dropping 300/o in 2002 to 930,000, ftorn-nearþ
$43,000 in 2001. "Malptactice Awards Remain Flat," IYall Street Journal, April 1,
2004. Jury Verdict Research is the source for this statistic, so it is likely thê drop
is even more signifìcant since JVR data is highly inflated. Also, the top 10 jury-
verdicts dropped to the lowest total amount since 1,997, and the number one 
-
verdict was the lowest in a decade. Bill lbelle, "Top Ten Jury verdicts Much
Smaller in 2003," Lnu2ers IYækþ USA.
Myth #4: "Civil jury trials are clogging the courts."
Fact: The vast majority of tort .ulJr u* resolved by neither juries nor judges. In
stâte courts, only five percent of tort cases were disposed of by trial in 2001,.
Examining tlte lWork of Søø Couús, 2002 Q003).
_ 
-P"rilg fìscal years 1996- 1,997, a iary or bench trial decided only 3 percenrof federal tort cases, meaning rhat 97 percent of tort cases were not decided by
üial. "FederaJTort Trials and Verdicrs, 1.996-97," NCJ 172855, U.S Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1,999).
Myth #5: "The legal sysrem's 'cosr to society' is an esrimated $200 billion a yeat"Fact: This widely-discredited 9200 billion figure is a calculation based on all
insurance premiums 
- 
even auto insurance for minor fender benders that never
come close to a couftfoom,
In other wotds, the fìgure has nothing to do v¡ith lawsuits or the legal system.
It also includes the immense costs of operating the incredibly wastefulãnd ineffì-
cient insurance industry. Moreover, most of the costs of the system are the result
of corporate wrongdoing causing injury.
-More importa_ntly, such numbers fail to factor in the cost savings, particularþto the taxpayer, of compensation and product safety. see Americani fór Insur-
ance Reform, "Tillinghast's 'Tort cost' Figures vastly overstate the cost of the
American Legal System [anuary 2004).
Myth #6: "Huge, multi-million-dollar punirive damages awards are rourine."
Fact: Awards of punitive damages in tort cases are both infrequent and modest
in size. According to the most recerit data from the Bureau of justice Statistics of
the u.S. Justice Department, punitive damages are imposed in only 3.3 percent of
cases, and the median (typical) punitive damages award is $38,000. "Toit Trials
and Verrlicts in Large Counties, 1.996," U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, NCJ 179769 (August 2000).
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